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David Evans — Mon, 30 Aug 2010 22:35:56 +0000

Listening to BP and Transocean executives testify about the Deepwater Horizon disaster is very much like hearing airline executives following an air crash testifying to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The selective memory, or non-memory, is breathtaking in its scope – until attentive NTSB members ask pertinent questions. And it’s not credible. This writer remembers details of infantry combat in Vietnam 40 years ago as vividly as if the events happened yesterday, right down to the dirt in hastily pulled-on combat boots. Similarly, anyone who has survived an air crash recalls details – the sights, smells, sounds that come from the “hypervigilance” associated with impending disaster. Yet the vice presidents and other executives both ashore and on the Deepwater Horizon rig were full of “I don’t recall” and “I don’t know” and “I can’t comment” and “I’m not specifically aware” and other suchlike phrases reflecting muddled and completely absent memory. The occasion of this memory vacuum was the probe last week by the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) into the 20 April explosion of the rig, killing 11 of the 126 people aboard and leading to the largest oil spill ever in the Gulf of Mexico. [caption id="attachment_1961" align="aligncenter" width="346" caption="The USCG/BOEM hearings are not sounding credible. Said one commentator: "Our government is covering for BP in a blatant disregard for the people of this country they profess to be protecting.""][/caption] The Coast Guard/BOEM hearing was carried on C-SPAN radio; anybody familiar with NTSB investigations into air crashes would have been outraged at the quality of questions and the non-responsiveness of the answers. Truly, the NTSB serves as a model for conducting such inquiries. BP’s executives were asked about the safety culture among deepwater drilling crews. They were not asked to produce that statement affirming commitment to safety. The executives replied that the safety culture differs for deepwater and shallow water crews. They did not outline specific difference, nor were they asked to. The answers were more along the lines of different procedures, which is not the same as the safety culture. The executives declared that any person who observes a safety violation can stop the operations; they were not able to cite a single instance where this was done. It was also evident that BOEM’s predecessor agency, the Bureau of Minerals Management (BMM), excised nil oversight of BP’s safety culture, much less oversight of its drilling operations. If the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) exercises infrequent oversight of airline and repair station operations – once a year or less – the agency nevertheless is a paragon of action compared to BMM/BOEM. Unfortunately, the comparison was not made by the inquisitors, because they obviously did not know what the FAA declares in policy documents and practices about a robust safety culture. In the FAA, there is at least lip service paid to the need for a just safety culture at both the national and the regional airlines. In BP, where deepwater and shallow water operations are analogous to national and regional airline operations, there is not even a recognition of the need for a common safety culture. Nor is there a single document, as in the airlines, directing operations. Recall that every airplane contains an aircraft operations manual (AOM), spelling out for aircrews exactly what procedures are to be followed. A common manual applies to maintenance, as well. At the hearing, BP executives testified that at least four different manuals were on the Deepwater Horizon spelling out procedures for drilling operations. The executives were not familiar with the manuals, or the differences between them, or the circumstances under which they must be referred before undertaking an operational evolution. It is as if the captain and first officer on an airliner had four separate AOMs, with an unspecified number of differences between them and no guidance as to which should predominate. The blow out preventer (BOP) was the last line of defense against catastrophe, yet many of its critical components were either inoperative or hooked up incorrectly. Unlike in the NTSB and the FAA, there was no discussion of the danger attendant to a “single point failure.” In the airlines, safety is built on the ethic of redundancy – two, three or even four back ups for functions that simply must perform (e.g., hydraulic and electrically powered engine and flight controls). For relevance to aviation, consider this reaction to the Coast Guard/BOEM hearing:

“For the people on this saga reconfiguring and plumbing hydraulics on deep water BOPs, hopefully please keep them away from Boeing or Airbus.”

Nor was there any discussion of documenting which components of the BOP were inoperative. One recalls the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL), which must be approved by the FAA for each airline. The MMEL lists which items of airplane equipment can be inoperative awaiting repair (usually a 10-day window) – for example, one can fly with a weather radar inoperative, so long as the back up fulfills the function. There is apparently nothing like the MMEL in drilling operations, so any number of systems can be inoperative and there is nothing to prevent the operation from proceeding. In the airline industry, the MMEL is the FAA’s way of guaranteeing that a minimum level of safety prevails. Nor is there anything like the flight data recorder (FDR) in offshore drilling operations. Recall that the FDR captures key engine, flight and system parameters and records them in a crash-hardened box for retrieval by investigators should the airplane crash. The data recorded by the black boxes have been instrumental in unraveling the cause of numerous crashes. There is a maritime equivalent of the FDR – the voyage data recorders – but such an instrument was not aboard the Deepwater Horizon. The Deepwater Horizon is treated like a vessel when the rig is underway, but not when it’s stationary conducting drilling operations (when a different chain of command prevails, just to add to the confusion – imagine two captains for an airliner, one for taxiing and another for flying). Moreover, many airlines now operate flight operations quality assurance (FOQA) programs, in which each flight is recorded, and later downloaded to identify and correct any “exceedances” (such as deploying flaps at too great a speed). FOQA programs have been instrumental in improving safety and crew conformance with set procedures. Again, there doesn’t seem to be any equivalent in the oil industry – despite the fact that drilling and refining operations are dangerous, with the potential to wreak multiple air crashes worth of damage. What comes through the Coast Guard/BOEM hearings is that the offshore oil industry has miles to go before it’s got minimum standards equivalent to those in the airline industry. Worse, it is also evident that the Coast Guard/BOEM questioners are not aware of how far behind they are in requiring rudimentary safety standards and providing industry oversight equivalent to that afforded by NTSB investigations. The questions asked at the Coast Guard/BOEM hearings were vague and open-ended; the responses were similarly vacuous. One observer characterized the hearings thusly:

“Some [BP executives] have simply refused to answer questions or deflected accountability. And the best our … inquirers can do is huff and puff and act indignant.”

The Coast Guard/BOEM hearings just don’t compare to NTSB inquiries, where acting indignant is a sure way to get in big trouble. Any number of former NTSB chairmen and board members can provide the Coast Guard/BOEM advice on how to conduct independent probes that get to root causes while educating the public. [caption id="attachment_1963" align="aligncenter" width="282" caption="The NTSB has earned a reputation for thoroughness, in part because Chairman Hersman herself digs deep."][/caption] It is probably too late for the Deepwater Horizon investigation, but unless the NTSB instructs the Coast Guard/BOEM in how airline safety practices and accident investigations are conducted, the offshore oil industry will likely engage in token measures that lag shockingly behind the norm in aviation.

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David Evans — Wed, 11 Aug 2010 20:06:12 +0000

The 10 August plane crash in the wilds of Alaska that killed former Sen. Ted Stevens (R-AL) is the latest in a long line of crashes that have killed politicians. Not that politicians as a group engage in risky behavior, but they do tend to fly more than the average Joe. As a result, the “normal” accident rate is highlighted because crashes involving public figures tend to be covered in the media. The typical flying architect, doctor or businessman – whether piloting his own airplane, or being flown by an air taxi operator – rates a mention in the local newspaper, but rarely is the crash covered in, say, the New York Times or NBC News. What the Stevens crash illustrates is the vast difference in safety depending on how one is in the air. Consider the three major groupings:

-- Part 121, which comprises the scheduled nationwide and regional airlines that carry paying passengers. -- Part 135, which covers the on-demand charter or air taxi operations which, again, transport paying passengers. -- Part 91, the general aviation operators, or basically pilots who fly their own airplanes and a few non-paying passengers.

And these three categories also involve successively greater levels of risk. The grim statistics belie the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) vaunted “one level of safety.” Had Stevens and his companions flown on a Part 121 carrier, statistically they would be in one accident for every 670,000 hours flying time. This calculation, and others to follow, are based on National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) figures for 2009, the most recent year for which the NTSB has calculated the number of accidents, the number of flight hours, and the deaths and injuries. Had Stevens and his buddies flown on a Part 135 on-demand charter, they would be exposed to one accident (fatal and nonfatal) for every 61,000 hours flying. If Stevens and company climbed aboard a friend’s or acquaintance’s airplane, Part 91, they would be exposed to accidents at the rate of one every 14,000 flying hours, statistically speaking. In fact, this is the type of operation in which the red DeHavilland DHC-3T was operating, with a pilot and eight passengers aboard the single engine, high wing floatplane. Five of the nine aboard died. [caption id="attachment_1952" align="aligncenter" width="307" caption="DeHavilland DHC-3T similar to the one that crashed."][/caption] A Part 91 operation does not have to file a flight plan with the FAA, nor is it required to have safety equipment found routinely on Part 121 and Part 135 operations. In this case, the Part 91 DeHavilland was not required to have a terrain warning device, which is significant. The wreckage was found at the end of a 100-yard gash through forest, the gash pointing toward the top of the ridgeline. It is apparent that in the fog and rain the pilot saw the rising terrain too late to clear it. A terrain warning device might well have alerted him to the hazard a good minute before the ridge appeared out of the mist. [caption id="attachment_1956" align="aligncenter" width="309" caption="Scene of the crash with airplane wreckage just above and to the right of the photo's center."][/caption] One of the most common attributes of Part 91 accidents is also germane: starting the flight in visual conditions, then finding visibility compromised by clouds – instrument conditions – but the pilot presses on in the hopes of finding a hole in the clouds. In any event, the three statistics can be summarized thusly:

-- One would have to fly 12 hours a day for 150+ years on a Part 121 commercial scheduled airliner to be involved in an accident. Commercial flying is 10 times safer than charter Part 135 operations, and about 50 times safer than Part 91 flying. -- One would have to fly 12 hours a day for 14 years on a Part 135 on-demand charter plane to be involved in an accident. Given that many of the “protections” built into Part 121 airline operations are also part of Part 135, this accident rate is atrocious. -- One would have to fly 12 hours a day for just 3 years to be involved in a Part 91 general aviation accident.

Consider the spread: 150 years between accidents aboard an airliner; 3 years between such mayhem aboard a general aviation aircraft. Here’s betting that people who fly as passengers on general aviation airplanes implicitly assume the operation is as safe – or nearly so – as an airliner, and probably equal in safety to an on-demand operation. It isn’t so. General aviation airplanes are involved in accidents at an average rate of four per day, and about one of these accidents every other day involves fatalities. If Part 121 and Part 135 airplanes were killing people at the rate of one airplane-full every other day, the fleets would be grounded. The accident rate for Part 91 airplanes is a little known scandal. Operators of these aircraft ought not be allowed to kill themselves and their passengers at this rate. One hopes as the NTSB investigates this tragedy that the larger issue of Part 91 non-safety is addressed, with a clear call to the FAA that improved standards and oversight are long overdue.

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David Evans — Thu, 29 Jul 2010 20:41:03 +0000

Investigation of the 20 July 2010 turbulence incident involving a United Airlines B777 over Missouri has just begun, but already a broader question arises: why haven’t all the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations to combat exposure to turbulence had an effect? People are still thrown about the cabin from turbulence, injured and occasionally even killed. [caption id="attachment_1948" align="aligncenter" width="285" caption="Sudden in-flight turbulence continues to injure passengers and flight attendants."][/caption] The latest incident involves a United B777 cruising at 34,000 feet, about 60 miles southeast of Kansas City, right into a wall of convective turbulence rising at 50-100 mph. The flight crew apparently made no evasive action (to be explored by NTSB investigators, for sure), and the airplane’s 265 passengers and crew were subjected to what one passenger described as “just a huge up and down.” Four flight attendants and about 20 passengers were injured to the extent that hospitalization was necessary. Fortunately, and unlike past turbulence encounters, there were no deaths. (See Aviation Safety Journal, ‘Turbulence During Flight Injures Scores; After Years of Such Events, Why Do They Continue?’) The NTSB has been issuing recommendations to counter turbulence encounters and injuries since the early 1970s. Either the recommendations are not relevant to the real dynamics of the problem, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has not responded effectively, or some combination of both factors must be at fault. For in-flight turbulence, since 1972 the NTSB has issued 46 recommendations. A summary of each recommendation may be found at Aviation Safety Journal. (See ASJ; ‘Long History of Turbulence Recommendations; Most Miss the Target’) From these nearly four dozen recommendations, a number of inferences can be made:

-- Deaths seem to be a much greater stimulus for NTSB recommendations than injuries. The recommendations are the result predominantly of fatal crashes. -- Of the 46 turbulence-related recommendations issued, 19 (41%) deal with the cruise phase, where most injuries occur. If the number of deaths and injuries in cruise were considered, the order probably should be reversed, with 60% of the recommendations addressed to the cruise phase of flight. -- Of the two “OPEN” recommendations (e.g. awaiting final FAA corrective action), none deal with passenger or crew safety during turbulence. -- Of the 18 “CLOSED” recommendations concerning turbulence in cruise, some have been overtaken by events, others are airplane specific and only one (A-73-002) deals with interior design to reduce injuries. -- No NTSB recommendations deal with flimsy overhead bin latches coming open during turbulence and spilling their contents onto passengers sitting below. -- None of the NTSB recommendations address the chronic problem of standing flight attendants being injured or killed during turbulence. -- None of the NTSB recommendations address the continued failure of all passengers to remain buckled up while seated. -- None of the recommendations address galley carts in the aisles. One can envision a means to secure them: a track in the floor, and a foot-pedal operated upside-down “T” fitting on the bottom of the cart to anchor it when stationary. Coffee pots could be secured by straps (coffee pots have been known to fly about during turbulence, scalding passengers). -- None of the NTSB recommendations address the dangerous practice of “lap children,” despite the history of such children being hurled to their injury or death during in-flight turbulence. -- None of the recommendations address cockpit-cabin crew coordination when turbulence is expected.

The NTSB claims it has a 90%-95% acceptance rate for its recommendations generally. In the area of turbulence, it has about an 80% acceptance rate, under the generous allowance that if the action was closed by the NTSB for even the flimsiest reasons advanced by the FAA, that recommendation counted towards the overall acceptance rate. It is also evident, from the recent injuries on the United Airlines flight over Missouri that the successfully implemented NTSB recommendations have had nil effect over the past 30 years at reducing injuries during in-flight cruise. The FAA has done the easy things that cost little, thereby garnering a high acceptance rate to the NTSB recommendations. The difficult efforts that require money tend to generate a huge amount of delaying correspondence and result in either a slow death to the recommendation or it being held in an “OPEN” status by the NTSB in the slim hope of implementation. The NTSB may wish to reconsider the process of generating recommendations. It seems that many are “down in the weeds,” offering much in the way of detailed, tactical advice. Meanwhile, the major issues – such as aircraft certification (see A-94-056) – which seem straightforward, languish in a miasma of “do nothingness.” Average time for recommendation on turbulence to be classified “CLOSED – Acceptable Action” is on the order of four years. The longest period to acceptance is 18 years. Given that most of the recommended actions in this category are simple, the time seems excessive and not behooving of a pro-active safety culture at the FAA. Then again, the sheer volume of NTSB recommendations has to be taken into account. Fewer, more strategic NTSB recommendations might reduce the workload at the FAA – at a “cost” to the NTSB of a lower percentage of “CLOSED – Acceptable Action” about which to crow. And if nothing is changed, recommendations coming out of the NTSB’s investigation of the United turbulence event will take 4-18 years to resolve, and the method of FAA implementation may have marginal effect on staunching injuries.

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David Evans — Fri, 23 Jul 2010 21:41:43 +0000

Cheapest adipex, A single-engine light plane carrying a patient to the Mayo Clinic crashed into Lake Michigan on Friday, 27 July, raising concerns about the safety of general aviation. Ordering adipex pill, The airplane was flown by a private pilot who had volunteered to transport the patient from Alma to Rochester, MI, adipex for sale. Kentucky KY Ky., The airplane was not flown by an emergency medical services (EMS) company that specializes in transport/evacuation of patients. Rather, Pennsylvania PA Penn., Oklahoma OK Okla., the airplane was owned by Freed Construction of Alma.

[caption id="attachment_1943" align="aligncenter" width="258" caption="A rescue vessel receives a survivor of the crash from a small fishing boat."][/caption]

The Cessna 206 was regularly used on a volunteer basis to transport patients to the Mayo Clinic, Tennessee TN Tenn..

On board the aircraft was owner Jerry Freed and pilot Earl Davidson, cheapest adipex. Cheapest adipex price, Also on board were three other individuals, whose names are not known at this time, adipex prescription. Connecticut CT Conn., The airplane crashed into the lake about 10 am off the shore of Ludington, a resort town on Michigan’s west coast, where to buy cheap adipex. Minnesota MN Minn., A small fishing boat rescued a survivor about two hours after the crash. At this point, order adipex online, District of Columbia DC D.C., the fate of the others is not known but they are presumed dead. Cheapest adipex, The airplane was equipped with an emergency locator transmitter (ELT), or radio beacon, that was activated on contact with the water. The ELT signal is detected by satellite and can be used to pinpoint the location of the wreckage, Washington WA Wash.. Order adipex, The planned flight was some 150 miles one-way.

Pilot Davidson reported loss of engine power to an air traffic controller at Minneapolis about 10 minutes before the plane went down, cheap generic adipex. Purchase adipex, The power problems apparently began about one-third of the way to Rochester; the airplane doubled back over Lake Michigan and then descended steeply near Ludington.

Coast Guard search and rescue operations are continuing, cheapest adipex.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will be investigating the crash, order adipex online. Buy adipex without prescription, Among the issue to be covered:

-- The lack of cockpit voice and data recorders, and the absence of a cockpit video recorder, Virginia VA Va., Cheap adipex tablet, which would have at least captured the status of instruments, controls, Delaware DE Del., New Hampshire NH N.H., and the pilot’s actions.

-- The use of a Part 91 General Aviation airplane to transport the patient, Wisconsin WI Wis.. Ordering adipex overnight delivery, Under Part 91, there are no standards regarding pilot flight and duty time, and maintenance records are also considerably less rigorous and detailed than for a Part 135 (air taxi) flight. Cheapest adipex, Companies specializing in patient transport are required to transport patients under Part 135 regulations, which are considerably more demanding. Under Part 135, a risk assessment of the flight was necessary and flight following by a company dispatcher should have been routine. As a General Aviation operation, neither criteria was required.

-- The use of a single engine piston transport for basically an overwater flight over a lake known for its cold water (and reduced survival time). In this case, the airplane could have flown to Benton Harbor, along the shore to Gary, and west up through Janesville, enroute to Rochester.

-- The presence in the airplane of life preservers and rafts, and whether or not the preservers were donned (uninflated) before the airplane crossed into the overwater portion of its flight, cheapest adipex.

News reports of the crash involving a “medical transport plane” may give their readers the illusion that this was a formal EMS flight by a company specializing in that kind of operation. It wasn’t; it was a Part 91 operation in which the owner and pilot were performing a voluntary service for a non-paying patient.

The Part 91 accident rate is far higher than for Part 135 (air taxi) or Part 121 (scheduled airline) operations. Patients and their relatives and care givers may not be aware of the poor safety record of Part 91 operations.

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David Evans — Wed, 21 Jul 2010 20:57:26 +0000

Ordering adipex pill, In the wake of the turbulence that struck United Airlines Flight 767, injuring passengers and flight attendants, the question arises: is the airline industry and is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) doing everything possible to prevent mayhem from convective winds. The answer: probably not.

The reason: injuries and even deaths continue to occur on a regular basis. Texas TX Tex., The Tuesday, 20 July, turbulence encounter of the United B777 wide body twinjet was reportedly the third such event for the airline this year. But who knows, buy generic adipex. At least six such airline encounters have occurred worldwide this month; the annual incidence is obviously higher, ordering adipex pill.

And clearly something is amiss in turbulence avoidance and injury mitigation policies, because frightening and even deadly encounters with potentially bone breaking turbulence continue to occur. West Virginia WV W.Va., Commercial airplanes run into turbulence 5,000 times a year, according to one account. Most of the encounters are above 10, adipex without a prescription,000 feet. Injury claims alone track into the tens of millions of dollars annually. Ordering adipex pill, The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will be investigating the event. Order adipex pill, The NTSB will reconstruct the weather at the time, the actions of air traffic controllers and the pilots. Although the NTSB is known more for investigating crashes, this turbulence encounter put people in the hospital; thus, Indiana IN Ind., the NTSB is empowered to investigate and make recommendations to ameliorate the hazard.

At this point, Kansas KS Kans., general outlines of the accident can be reconstructed. United flight 967 was en route from Dulles International Airport near Washington DC, bound Tuesday night for Los Angeles International Airport. There were 255 passengers and 10 crewmembers aboard, ordering adipex pill. Over Kansas, order adipex, directly in the path of the westbound jet, a rapidly forming severe thunderstorm was boiling upward. Cheap adipex without prescription, The storm climbed from about 25,000 feet to 45,000 feet in 30 minutes. It produced large hail, buy adipex online legally, indicating the presence of severe turbulence. Updrafts of 50-100 mph are not uncommon.

[caption id="attachment_1937" align="aligncenter" width="345" caption="Radar image of Kansas about the time that United flight 967 encountered severe turbulence."] Ordering adipex pill, [/caption]

The plane was flying at 34,000 feet, directly into a wall of convective turbulence. Buy adipex pill, Flying into this wall, the airplane jumped. The rapid change in altitude, as in previous turbulence encounters, order adipex online without prescription, caused everything not secured by straps, locks, Missouri MO Mo., latches and whatnot to be hurled about the cabin. This includes people.

One passenger described the encounter as “just a huge up and down.” She said her seatbelt was tight; the woman sitting next to her hit her head on the side of the cabin, and a girl across the aisle flew into the air and hit the ceiling, cheap adipex online without prescription.

It is not known how many passengers were wearing their seat belts; the seatbelt sign was illuminated at the time, ordering adipex pill. It is not known if the word had been passed from the cockpit to be seated with seatbelts latched because of impending turbulence..

Four flight attendants were injured. Buy adipex no prescription, It is not known if they were standing at the time or were strapped into their jump seats. Flight attendant jump seats, unlike 16G passenger seats, are only 9G capable and they have collapsed in previous incidents, purchase adipex online, injuring flight attendants. Ordering adipex pill, Passengers screamed as the airplane bounced in the turbulence. The uninjured flight attendants calmed everyone down fairly rapidly. Cheap adipex pill, Because of the injuries, the captain elected to divert the flight to Denver for immediate medical attention of those individuals who were hurt. The airplane landed at 7:45 pm and the injured passengers and flight attendants, about 25 in all, buy adipex online, were treated by paramedics at the scene and then transported to hospital. About 19 were released from hospital the following morning.

The airplane was inspected and found to be structurally sound, ordering adipex pill. Buy adipex, Unknown, however, is the condition of the cabin. In previous incidents, cheap adipex, sidewall and ceiling panels have been displaced, and overhead bin doors have popped open, Buy adipex from canada, spilling their contents and contributing to injuries and the general sense of mayhem.

At Denver, a few of the braver passengers boarded another United flight for Los Angeles.

Given that records exist of the upwelling thunderstorms along the airplane’s route, buy adipex, a number of pertinent issues are sure to be explored by investigators:

-- Did air traffic controllers see the convective activity on their scopes. Ordering adipex pill, If so, what did they tell the pilots. Additionally, Massachusetts MA Mass., controllers would be in receipt of Pilot Reports (PIREP) which should generate a SIGMET (significant meteorological activity) that’s broadcast to all aircraft in the area.

-- What did the dispatcher at United operations center know about the evolving weather, and did he do anything.

-- Did the pilots see the convective activity ahead on their weather radar, ordering adipex from canada. If so, did they attempt evasive action or continue on their flight path. Did they make a public address (PA) announcement about the turbulence ahead, ordering adipex pill. Adipex cheap, Were flight attendants ordered to be seated, or were they caught by turbulence while checking passenger seat belts.

-- What is the United Airlines policy to flight crews regarding convective weather activity. Is at a 10 mile avoidance policy. A greater distance. Ordering adipex pill, Or is there no policy at all at United. It is clear that policies run the gamut from one airline to another; a more uniform avoidance policy – established by the FAA – may make for predictability and safer travel throughout the industry.

-- The vulnerability of the cabin to damage and disruption caused by in flight turbulence is unconscionable, given that these events have been occurring for years. Every seat should be stressed for 16G. Every person should be strapped in, including so-called “lap children.”

-- Perhaps overhead bin doors with their flimsy latches should be redesigned, to include an electric lock activated from the cockpit on pushback to secure the bin doors until landing.

-- The in-flight safety video could include two crash dummies subjected to severe turbulence while seated, ordering adipex pill. One dummy could be strapped in; the other not. Passengers would see the risk of not having the seat belt affixed immediately.

-- Northwest Airlines employs a Turbulence Plot System that is regarded as the gold standard for turbulence avoidance. Based on FAA data from 1980-1996, Northwest had the lowest turbulence encounter rate among six major U.S. commercial carriers. Other airlines have purchased the system, but not – according to a 2010 report – United.

The issue is not who voluntarily adapts a proven system, but whether or not the FAA has evaluated the Turbulence Plot System, found it effective, and mandated its adoption across the industry.

This latest event may have been caused by rising turbulent clouds over Kansas, but the long miasma of complacency at the FAA about cabin structure and turbulence avoidance are the root causes of continuing injury.

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David Evans — Tue, 20 Jul 2010 18:50:42 +0000

Adipex cheap, The “letter war” between the two agencies is not improving safety, but it is proof of the old adage that three inches of flame will shield one’s derriere from accountability.

Case in point: the recommendations issued in 2006 to improve the safety of medical evacuation flights, especially those flown by helicopters. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued four recommendations. Taken as a group, cheapest adipex, they are classified RED by the NTSB – for unacceptable response – because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is progressing slowly in implementing them. Progress may be lagging but, boy, Colorado CO Colo., the FAA has issued pages and pages of bland assurances to the NTSB that the situation is in hand.

That is debatable, adipex cheap. Helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) flights are falling out of the sky with appalling regularity, killing patients, pilots, nurses, Florida FL Fla., and other people aboard or on the ground.

[caption id="attachment_1932" align="aligncenter" width="376" caption="While helicopter ambulances continue to crash, the FAA dithers."]Nevada NV Nev., the FAA dithers." width="376" height="239" />[/caption]

Here is the record for the past three years:

HEMS Accidents2008 to Present
Date	Location	Operator	Casualties
5 Feb. 2008	South Padre Island, TX	Metro Aviation Inc.	3 fatal
10 May 2008	La Crosse, WI	Air Methods Corp.	3 fatal
21 May 2008	Hiram, GA	Omniflight Helicopters Inc.	None
29 May 2008	Grand Rapids, pharmacy adipex, MI	Aero Med Spectrum Health	2 serious injuries
30 May 2008	Pottsville, PA	Lehigh Valley Medevac	3 minor injuries
8 June 2008	Hunstville, TX	PHI Inc.	4 fatal
27 June 2008	Ash Fork, Rhode Island RI R.I., AZ	PHI Inc.	3 serious injuries
29 June 2008	Flagstaff, AZ	Air Methods Corp.	7 fatal
29 June 2008	Flagstaff, AZ	Classic Helicopter Lifeguard	7 fatal
31 Aug. 2008	Greensburg, IN	Air Evac Lifeteam	3 fatal
27 Sept, where to buy adipex. 2008	Adipex cheap, District Heights, MD	Maryland State Police	4 fatal1 serious injury
15 Oct. 2008	Aurora, IL	Air Angels Inc	4 fatal
22 Feb. 2009	Cave Creek, Adipex generic, AZ	PHI Inc.	None
2 July 2009	Loris, SC	Omniflight Helicopter Inc.	None
17 Aug. 2009	North Captiva Island, FL	Lee County Division of Public Safety	None
22 Sept. 2009	Page, cheap adipex online, AZ	Omniflight Helicopters Inc.	None
24 Sept. 2009	Tucson, AZ	Air Methods Corp.	None
25 Sept, adipex cheap. 2009	Georgetown, SC	Carolina Life Care	3 fatal
22 Oct. North Carolina NC N.C., 2009	Lythe, CA	Tristate Careflight LLC	None
14 Nov. 2009	Doyle, CA	Mountain Lifeflight	3 fatal
25 Dec. 2009	Decatur, discount adipex, TX	Air Evac EMS Inc.	None
17 Jan. 2010	Adipex cheap, Reno, NV	Air Methods	2 serious injuries1 minor injury
5 Feb. 2010	El Paso, TX	Southwest Med Evac	3 fatal
11 Feb. Adipex without a prescription, 2010	Cheverly, MD	Maryland State Police	None
25 March 2010	Brownsville, TN	Hospital Wing	3 fatal
2 June 2010	Midlothian, TX	CareFlight	2 fatal
Total for the 29 month period: 26 helicopters banged up or destroyed49 fatalities 8 serious injuries 4 minor injuries

Basically, about two people per month are killed or injured in HEMS flights, online adipex. The total, 61 dead and injured, exceeds the 50 or so persons on board a regional airliner; and no matter how the calculation is done, Colorado CO Colo., being aboard a Part 135 HEMS flight is considerably riskier to life and limb than being a passenger on a Part 121 airliner. The HEMS accident rate is fuzzier, because unlike for airliners, we don’t know how much air time the HEMS industry logged. Suffice to say, though, if Part 121 airliners were crashing at a rate of about 0.90 per month – as are the evacuation helicopters – the airline fleet would be grounded, adipex cheap. In this case, cheap adipex tablet, HEMS flights are still conducted despite the grim recent record of broken aluminum and shattered bodies.

Now consider the FAA’s pallid response to the NTSB’s 2006 recommendations.

A-06-12, Generic adipex, Require operators to conduct all EMS flights with medical personnel on board in accordance with commercial flight operations. The FAA stated in March 2010 that, because an IFR [instrument flight rules] flight provides guaranteed obstacles clearance, continuous radio communication with air traffic control, and radar contact, order adipex online cheap, this option provides a HEMS operator with an equivalent level of safety to that of a Part 135 [air taxi] visual flight rules flight. Adipex cheap, The only problem here is that despite three pages of back-and-forth letters between the NTSB and the FAA, the fact remains that the NTSB’s word – “require” – has not been acted upon. The NTSB characterizes the FAA response to this recommendation as “OPEN – Unacceptable Response.”

A-06-13, Require EMS operators to develop and implement flight risk evaluation programs. Cheapest adipex online, The industry had a 94% compliance with risk assessment; FAA is working on a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to make risk assessments a requirement. Despite promises to issue the NPRM in January 2010, it has yet to be issued. For its slow rate of progress, the FAA response is categorized by the NTSB as “OPEN – Unacceptable Response.” Note that its been four years since the recommendation and an NPRM has yet to be issued; after the NPRM is issued, purchase adipex online, the FAA will have to consider all comments before issuing a final rule. Action on this recommendation is at least two years away, adipex cheap.

A-06-14, Require formalized flight following and dispatch procedures including up-to-date weather. Order adipex online legally, The FAA’s May 2008 publication of Advisory Circular (AC) 120-96, “Integration of Operations Control Centers [OCC] into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations,” only partially satisfied the NTSB recommendation, as an AC does not “require” implementation. The FAA promised an NPRM by January 2010; no such document has been found on the Federal Register, adipex without prescription. Only because an AC has been issued, the NTSB classifies the response to this recommendations as “OPEN – Acceptable Response.”

A-06-15, Require EMS operators to install TAWS [terrain alert and warning systems]. Adipex cheap, The latest FF response is dated April 2009, promising to complete work on an NPRM by January 2010. Minnesota MN Minn., It appears that much was promised by January 2010, none of which was delivered. The NTSB said, “FAA initiated rulemaking process, but little progress has been made.” The recommendation was classified, Nebraska NE Nebr., “OPEN – Unacceptable Response.”

All four recommendations are still “OPEN” and only in one was the response deemed “Acceptable” because a non-mandatory AC was issued. A literal reading of all four recommendations, each of which contains the word “require, Ordering adipex overnight delivery, ” indicated nil progress.

Let us consider just one of the accident flights in the table above: the 8 June 2008 nighttime crash at Huntsville, TX, of the PHI Bell 407. TAWS might well have alerted the pilot to his dangerous proximity to ground, adipex cheap. The NTSB issued a recommendation for TAWS two years before the accident, order adipex no rx.

In February 2009 the NTSB held a three-day hearing on the safety of HEMS flights. After this 3-day conclave, 21 additional recommendations were issued. None of them has been fully implemented. Adipex cheap, These recommendations were issued right in the middle of the three-year record of HEMS flight accidents in the table above.

The NTSB must be into self-flagellation, issuing 21 additional recommendations on top of the four languishing above.

But this commentary isn’t about the NTSB. It’s about the dismal record of the FAA at stemming the continuing mayhem in helicopter ambulance flights. If the FAA’s job is to protect the flying public – in this case patients strapped to a gurney, and the pilots and flight nurses sent to rescue them – the agency has been a dismal failure.

One thing is evident: had the FAA spent a little less time sending letters to the NTSB explaining why progress was difficult and time-consuming, it might have freed up a few bureaucrats to actually solve the problems.

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David Evans — Fri, 16 Jul 2010 18:27:46 +0000

Buy adipex no prescription, There is something deeply paradoxical and disconcerting about the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Here is an agency that touts safety as its highest priority, yet its actions are dilatory, Order adipex overnight delivery, incomplete, and reflect a regulatory lassitude that is inexcusable.

Four recent examples certainly suggest this damning indictment.

First, adipex sale, a 29 June 2010 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on airframe and engine icing, dealing primarily with supercooled liquid droplets (SLD) that slap and stick on metal, Cheapest adipex price, turning to ice. Note, first of all, that this is a proposed rule, Arkansas AR Ark., not a final rule. In other words, the FAA is seeking comments, and it could be a year or more before it publishes a final rule, buy adipex no prescription.

Following fatal icing accidents at Roselawn and Monroe, Cheap generic adipex, the National Transportation Safety Board issued two recommendations to the FAA regarding SLD. Both recommendations languish, the NTSB having characterized the FAA reaction to them as “OPEN – Unacceptable response.” The matters contained in the NPRM are intended to respond to the NTSB, but the “Unacceptable response” characterization will remain until the FAA publishes a final rule sometime a year or two hence, Oklahoma OK Okla..

Publication of the final rule won’t immediately effect one airplane. Lets look at the overall evolution, Hawaii HI, here, from womb to tomb (an appropriate metaphor given the accusation that the FAA is a “tombstone” agency requiring dead bodies to galvanize safety action). Buy adipex no prescription, Since the ATR-72 accident at Roselawn, it has taken about 14 years and 8 months to bring the SLD issue to the proposal stage. If codified and effective, say, cheap adipex no prescription, at the beginning of 2011, and application made for type certification of a transport airplane at that time, New Mexico NM N.Mex., the airplane will have up to five years to be certificated to this rule, or until 2016 before the first airplane of the type would enter service. It will take several more years for the fleet to accrue significant exposure, necessary to determine if the rule has the intended effect on the safety of airline operations in icing conditions, ordering adipex online without prescription.

Total elapsed time, approximately 25 years – a quarter of a century – from accident to improvement. Ordering adipex, Example 2: an FAA Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) of 6 July 2010. The SAFO basically says that for stall training in the simulator, the old guidance of training the pilot to recover with “minimum altitude loss” is out, buy adipex no prescription. It is critically important that the pilot lower the nose (decrease back-pressure on the control yoke or side stick), add power, and increase speed to recover from a stall, lowest price adipex. Holding altitude or endeavoring to minimize altitude loss (without good cause, such as a ground proximity warning) can be a death sentence. Connecticut CT Conn., The SAFO follows Canadian guidance to this effect issued three years ago. And the change to approach to stall recovery was first urged back in 1999. Buy adipex no prescription, That was 11 years ago. The FAA gets the “golden tombstone” for this belated action. There are a number of fatal accidents that could probably have been avoided had the pilots responded to the stall warning/upset along the lines suggested in this SAFO, Louisiana LA.

Example 3: an Airworthiness Directive (AD) issued 7 July 2010 regarding in-flight entertainment systems that do not have an ON/OFF switch in the cockpit enabling the crew to cut power in the event of smoke or flames from the system. While a circuit breaker (CB) does enable electrical power to be terminated, Cheap adipex overnight delivery, CBs are not to be routinely used as switches as this habit decreases the life of the breaker, resulting in failed circuits, smoke or fire.

The AD makes mandatory a number of Boeing Service Bulletins (SBs) on the corrective action for B777 jetliners (readers may recall the control boxes under the seats that control individual monitors; the boxes also reduce foot room), buy adipex no prescription.

Following the 1998 fatal crash at Halifax of Swissair flight 111 from a rampaging fire believed to have begun in the location of in-flight entertainment system wiring, ordering adipex online legally, Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada investigators were dismayed to discover there was no installed ON/OFF switch for the entertainment system on the accident MD-11 and commented extensively about the hazard in their final report.

An FAA official concedes, Indiana IN Ind., “There is nothing in the FARs [Federal Aviation Regulations] prohibiting the use of CBs as switches.”

Here we are, 12 years after the Swissair accident, 7 years after the TSB final report, 4 years after the Boeing SBs, Alaska AK, still dealing with in-flight entertainment systems without an ON/OFF switch. Another 5 years is allowed for installation, Vermont VT Vt., bringing the time from the Swissair crash to final fix to a total of 17 years.

Example 4: An AD published 13 July 2010 to prevent windshield cracking caused by loose electrical connections in the window heater. Buy adipex no prescription, We’re not talking of one or two cracks, but wholesale cracking that impedes vision and has showered pilots and instrument panels with jagged pieces of shattered glass.

[caption id="attachment_1927" align="aligncenter" width="321" caption="Cracked windscreen on an American Airlines B757 en route from Puerto Rico to Philadelphia, diverted to an emergency landing at West Palm Beach, order adipex online, FL, in 2008."]California CA Calif., diverted to an emergency landing at West Palm Beach, FL, in 2008." width="321" height="241" />[/caption]

The FAA recounts 11 reports of smoke and fire from windscreen heaters. The most recent emergency landing resulting from this hazard occurred 16 May 2010 involved a United 757 at Dulles International Airport in Washington, cheap adipex online, DC.

Although replacement of the windscreen and heater controls is an alternative to the AD, Tennessee TN Tenn., which calls for inspection and repair on over 1,000 Boeing airliners, Continental Airlines notes that access to components requiring inspection is “atrocious.” Limited access, coupled to poor “view-ability” turns a simple task into a very difficult one requiring special tooling, District of Columbia DC D.C..

Given the redesign and tooling work necessary to yield a safer windscreen, one would think that replacement of the whole windscreen and associated electrical circuits would be more than justified. It appears that the original design was marginal from an inspection, maintenance and safety standpoint, buy adipex no prescription. Maryland MD Md., The FAA’s mandate to inspect, not replace, seems totally inappropriate given the cost of an emergency landing, or worse.

Note that the four examples cited here occurred within the last month. More examples for the same period could easily be produced. Add up the number of late, incomplete or token safety measures taken within a year and 50-100 such citations could be counted. Tote up the total over 5-10 years; the number of safety deficiencies is simply staggering.

What this reflects is a tolerance at the highest levels in the FAA for a regulatory torpor more seemly for Rip Van Winkle than for an aggressive regulatory agency with the mission of protecting the flying public. One wonders: does the FAA even recognize how slack and inept it appears.

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admin — Wed, 14 Jul 2010 14:34:52 +0000

Buy adipex online cheap, On July 13, 2010 Cook County Judge Donald J. Buy adipex overnight delivery, Suriano approved a settlement in the amount of $6,250, Ohio OH, Order adipex pill, 000.00 for the benefit of Luis and Kathy Vasquez. Luis Vasquez was a roofer for Knickerbocker Roofing and Paving Co. and suffered severe injuries on March 8, buy adipex no prescription, Buy adipex pill, 2004 when he fell through a roof on the premises owned and operated by Metra known as the 51st Street Coach House. Mr, price of adipex. Idaho ID, Vasquez fell straight through a concrete roofing tile some twenty feet to the concrete floor below. The general contractor for the entire project including the re-roof project was Defendant Walsh Construction Company, buy adipex online cheap. The roofing contractor, cheap adipex online without prescription, Adipex pharmacy, a sub contractor to Walsh, was Knickerbocker Roofing and Paving Company, cheap adipex without prescription. Washington WA Wash., CTE, Inc., cheap adipex, Order adipex online without prescription, a/k/a Consoer Townsend Environdyne and Cotter Consulting were also contractors. Plaintiffs allege the Defendants were jointly responsible for inspection of the panels and that Defendant Walsh was responsible for safety on the job.

The $6.25M was paid by all Defendants to settle all claims. Settlement includes waiver of the $560, buy adipex no rx, Massachusetts MA Mass., 000.00 workers’ compensation lien.

Luis and Kathy Vasquez are represented by Donald J. Nolan, adipex no prescription, Adipex price, Thomas P. Buy adipex online cheap, Routh and Paul R. Borth, adipex online store, Georgia GA Ga., of Nolan Law Group in Chicago, Illinois, Missouri MO Mo.. Ordering adipex pill, Defendant Walsh Construction Company is represented by Thomas Boylan and Bradford Burton of Cassiday Schade, LLP in Chicago, buy generic adipex, Mississippi MS Miss., Illinois.

Defendant Metra is represented by Michael McColl of Foran Glennon Palandech Ponzi & Rudloff, ordering adipex no prescription, Where to buy cheap adipex, PC in Chicago, Illinois.

Defendant CTE, Inc. is represented by C. Steven Tomashefsky and Jean Gallo of Stein, Ray & Harris, LLP in Chicago, Illinois.

Defendant Cotter Consulting is represented by Bruce Lyon and Angie Grove of LaBarge, Campbell & Lyon in Chicago, Illinois.

Defendant Knickerbocker is represented by John Prusik of Prusik Selby Daley & Kezelis in Chicago, Illinois.

CASE NUMBER: 04 L 011387 Vasquez v, buy adipex online cheap. Walsh Construction Co., of Illinois et al.

JUDGE: The Honorable Donald J. Suriano

Settlement Amount: $ 6,250,000.00

Nolan Law Group is a Chicago based personal injury law firm concentrating in aviation accidents, construction accidents, brain injury litigation, medical malpractice, premises liability, product liability, and trucking accidents.

Questions should be directed to Thomas P. Routh of Nolan Law Group at 312.630.4000.

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David Evans — Wed, 07 Jul 2010 20:19:00 +0000

Buy adipex online legally, The fatal crash of a medical evacuation airplane is certain to be investigated with an eye to unrequited recommendation to improve aerial ambulance operations.

Shortly after midnight on 4 July, in clear weather, buy cheap adipex, an O’Hara Flying Service-operated twin-engine Cessna 421 aerial ambulance took off from Alpine-Casparis Municipal Airport, Order adipex, Texas, for a flight to Midland International Airport, Texas, generic adipex. The airplane was carrying patient Mary Folger, Cheap adipex from canada, 73, who had broken her hip. She was accompanied by her husband, Guy Folger 78, Virginia VA Va.. Two flight nurses were aboard, Buy cheap adipex online, Sharon Falkener and Tracy Chambers. Piloting the aircraft was Ted Caffarel, 59, buy adipex without prescription.

[caption id="attachment_1912" align="aligncenter" width="300" caption="Crash scene at Alpine, Texas, of an O’Hara Flying Service air ambulance, killing all 5 aboard."][/caption]

After an uneventful takeoff, the airplane experienced some sort of problem, perhaps engine related, and Caffarel was attempting a return to the departure airfield, buy adipex online legally. About a mile short of the runway, Buy adipex, a main landing gear wheel hit a rut in an open, muddy field. The airplane overturned at least once and burst into flames, order adipex from canada. There were no survivors. Maine ME Me., In May 2009, another O’Hara Flying Service aircraft, also a Cessna 421, order adipex online, was substantially damaged during a forced landing following the loss of engine power shortly after takeoff near Alpine. Buy adipex online legally, The pilot was the sole occupant of this positioning flight and received minor injuries in the incident. Wyoming WY Wyo., It is not known if this earlier event involved the same Cessna 421 or one of its engines.

Between December 2007 and February 2010 a total of 41 patients and flight crew have been killed in EMS fixed-wing and helicopter accidents. Generally, buy adipex cheap, EMS flight safety is about 30 times lower than it is for commercial airline operations. Cheap adipex online cheap, The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will be investigating this accident. The NTSB has a long record of concern about the safety of Emergency Medical Service (EMS) flights, buy adipex online legally. A special investigation report was produced in 2006 that examined about 40 EMS accidents. In 2008 helicopter EMS accidents hit an all-time high, New Hampshire NH N.H., with 29 fatalities, Cheap adipex online legally, prompting the NTSB to hold a public hearing on HEMS safety in February 2009. In addition to the four safety recommendations issued as part of the 2006 study, the 2009 forum produced an additional, Delaware DE Del., and whopping, Order adipex without prescription, 21 recommendations. None have been fully implemented. Buy adipex online legally, In February of this year, the NTSB increased the pressure to act on the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) by adding the improved safety of EMS flights to its “Most Wanted” list of still-to-be-enacted improvements. On that “Most Wanted” list was the recommendation to install Terrain Awareness Warning Systems (TAWS) on all EMS flying machines, Arizona AZ Ariz.. A technical standard order (TSO) was released by the FAA for TAWS in December 2008, Pennsylvania PA Penn., but the FAA has yet to take action requiring such a system to be installed on EMS aircraft and helicopters. The NTSB has characterized its moribund TAWS recommendation as “Open – Unacceptable Response.”

It is not known at this time if O’Hara Flying Service voluntarily installed TAWS on its EMS air ambulances. Since there was no FAA requirement to do so, cheap adipex no rx, there is reasonable suspicion that the accident airplane was not equipped with TAWS.

TAWS might have prevented this night time crash, buy adipex online legally. Ordering adipex from canada, TAWS may have alerted the pilot to his low altitude, preventing the premature contact with the ground as pilot Caffarel was returning to the runway.

The NTSB investigation will doubtless discuss the legacy of FAA-ignored recommendations as part of its investigation of this accident, Wisconsin WI Wis..

Of interest, Illinois IL Ill., the NTSB has never recommended two pilots in the cockpit. Single pilots like Caffarel frequently rely on a flight nurse in the co-pilot’s seat to manage part of the radio communications and to maintain a look out the cockpit for other aircraft or terrain. Buy adipex online legally, In Canada, which has not suffered a single fatal EMS accident, two-pilot operation is required.

No commercial airline flights would be undertaken by a single pilot, New York NY N.Y.. Yet here is an EMS flight, with passengers, being flown by one pilot, who had an emergency such that he was attempting to return to the departure airfield.

Any number of NTSB reports on EMS accidents have served to justify its recommendation for TAWS, but TAWS is best employed with two pilots. TAWS alerts require one pilot to be looking out the windscreen while the other pilot tracks the dangerous rising terrain on the cockpit display.

And if he had an engine problem, Caffarel could certainly have used a co-pilot to manage the overall situation. With the resources of two pilots’ trouble shooting, and TAWS to avoid premature ground contact, the fiery crash just may have been avoided.

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David Evans — Wed, 30 Jun 2010 21:43:36 +0000

Cheap adipex no rx, For a highly pertinent example of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) not following-up on its own research, look no further than its requirements for life preservers. I use life preservers as my prime example because, Ordering adipex online, unlike avionics and other esoteric electro-mechanicals of airplanes, most people understand the problem of floating for extended periods in cold water.

Cold water is the key, purchase adipex. Water saps the body’s heat at a much faster rate than cold air. Oregon OR Ore., With the body numb from cold, muscle coordination atrophies, the mind loses concentration – the will to live is sapped much quicker, Michigan MI Mich.. In cold water, even if one’s head is kept above the waves, one can die from the cold even if the airway is free to breathe, cheap adipex no rx. And remember, Buy adipex online legally, many survivors of a ditching may be suffering from shock and trauma even before they grab a flotation aid and evacuate the sinking airliner. These people are doubly vulnerable to the effects of cold water.

Every seat cushion and life preserver on an airplane used for flotation must conform to the FAA’s Technical Standard Order, in this case TSO-C13f, buy adipex from canada, issued in 1992, Adipex online cheap, dealing with life preservers.

The TSO covers a great deal about the required preserver performance. Herewith, selected passages:

“This technical standard order (TSO) prescribes the minimum performance standards [emphasis added] that life preservers must meet …”

“This standard covers inflatable (Type I) and noninflatable (Type II) life preservers, South Carolina SC S.C.. Both Type I and Type II preservers are divided into the following four categories: Adult, Montana MT Mont., Adult-Child, Child, and Infant-Small Child.”

“For coated fabrics used in the manufacture of inflation chambers, West Virginia WV W.Va., the maximum permeability to helium may not exceed 5 liters/square meter in 24 hours at 77 degrees F or its equivalent using hydrogen.”

“The force necessary to operate the mechanical inflation means may not exceed 15 pounds when applied through the pull cord.”

“(A)t least 75% of the total number of test subjects … can don the life preserver within 25 seconds unassisted, Texas TX Tex., starting with the life preserver in its storage package …”

“After donning, inadvertent release by the wearer is not likely.”

The TSO lists the required color of the vest (international orange-yellow), the readability of instructions (a minimum viewing distance of 24 inches with illumination no greater than 0.05 foot-candle), adipex cheap, and material properties (separation rate must be 2.0 to 2.5 inches/minute). Cheap adipex no rx, Buoyancy, survivor locator light performance, and salt-spray standards are laid out in detail. Order adipex, Oh, and the preserver must be comfortable to wear in the water.

The TSO is absolutely silent on a critical matter: its aid in heat retention in cold water. A 1985 report by the FAA’s Civil Aeromedical Institute (Report No, adipex online. DOT/FAA-AM-85-11) on the development of a better life preserver noted:

“If a life preserver provides a measure of thermal protection, South Dakota SD, not only are the chances of death caused by hypothermia decreased, but also the chances of death caused by drowning decrease.”

Citing a number of accidents where aircraft crashed into cold water, the FAA required research into a preserver that would not only keep the person afloat but would also “provide increased thermal protection in the event of accidental submersion in cold water.” This requirement was in addition to a donning time of 15 seconds, cheapest adipex in the world, and all the buoyancy, Adipex prescription, marking and storage requirements of the existing TSO.

During water immersion, the body loses heat at about 26 times the rate it does in air. A close fitting life preserver was designed to minimize degradation of the body’s core temperature in the upper torso (most heat is lost from the trunk, buy adipex online, not the limbs).

Test subjects, Ordering adipex no rx, outfitted with rectal thermometers, were required to wear a prototype preserver in cold water, and a trial was also conducted with the standard life preserver found on airliners today, cheap adipex pill. Pages and pages of graphs show that the prototype preserver retained about 50%-60% more body heat.

Based on rectal temperatures of subjects in 55 degree water, the report concluded:

“(T)he mean estimated predicted survival time was greater for subjects wearing the prototype life preserver than when the same subjects wore the standard PFD [personal flotation device].”

Note, this prototype preserver met all the other requirements for storage (in the same space), for buoyancy (35 pounds), for ease of donning (about 18 seconds), and so forth.

Note also that the improved life preserver report was produced in 1985, a good seven years before publication of the current TSO, cheap adipex no rx. Even the FAA apparently has forgotten about this report and its life-saving findings. Ordering adipex without prescription, It had no effect on the TSO or any other FAA requirements for life preserver effectiveness.

Basically, passengers today rely on either the seat cushion, with absolutely no thermal protection, Alabama AL Ala., or an obsolescent preserver that was not designed with heat retention as a basic function.

The improved design could be produced at about the same cost. Adipex for sale, Why was it not pushed by the FAA. One suspects industry resistance at the total cost – which could be absorbed through a multi-year program of fielding the improved model, estimated to cost about $35 apiece.

This is not the only case where the FAA has developed something that enhances safety that does not find its way into the airline fleet, New Jersey NJ N.J.. Cheap adipex no rx, In 1979 the FAA Technical Center published a report on its successful fuel tank inerting system. This 600-pound system displaced explosive fuel-air gasses in fuel tanks with inert nitrogen enriched air. Buy adipex online cheap, The technology was tested in an FAA DC-9 airliner and passed all performance criteria with flying colors. The weight of the inerting system, we should note, was comparable to or less than the weight of many in-flight entertainment systems, which the airlines have aggressively deployed.

The FAA never mandated that this inerting system be installed on airliners. In 1996, TWA Flight 800, a B747, blew up when volatile vapors exploded in the plane’s center fuel tank. Now the FAA has ordered a less-capable inerting technology to be installed in all but the oldest airliners, and to get the job done by 2018 – fully 22 years after TWA 800 exploded, cheap adipex no rx. (See Aviation Safety Journal, August 2008, ‘Significant Regulatory & Related Activity’)

In light of all this, a couple pertinent questions arise. First, why does the FAA bother to explore new technologies or equipment if the results of its efforts just gather dust in obscure reports. Millions of dollars could be saved by closing down the Civil Aeromedical Institute and the Technical Center. This writer cannot think of a single technology or improvement that has been adopted as a result of the work at these subordinate agencies.

Second, if the Civil Aeromedical Institute and the Technical Center are going to be retained, and they continue to develop useful devices and techniques for the safety of the industry, there is an obviously related and relevant question: why isn’t there a link between the FAA’s development efforts and FAA requirements for implementation or adoption by the airline industry?

There is no evident linkage. In an FAA that touts safety as Job #1, advances to safety developed by the agency’s most committed and best minds seems to languish somewhere around Job #0.